U.S. President Donald Trump’s “America First” policy and the resultant perception that the US security guarantee to its allies and partners in the rest of the world is no longer infallible, particularly its “nuclear umbrella,” seem to have reignited debates in many parts of the world on how to strengthen nuclear deterrence.
In what is a mark of solidarity, leading European powers are now discussing nuclear collaborations. Their argument is that to insure itself against possible American disengagement, Europe must prepare to assume total responsibility for its defense, including an expanded nuclear deterrent. They want the United Kingdom and France to take the lead in this regard.
In fact, the other day (March 19), British Defense Secretary John Healy warned that Britain has the power to do “untold damage” to adversaries such as Russia with its nuclear deterrent.
He said this while laying the keel for HMS Dreadnought, the first boat of the four ballistic missile submarines being built to replace the Vanguard class nuclear-armed submarines, in a ceremony in Barrow-in-Furness that was watched by his Prime Minister Keir Starmer.
In a subsequent interview with the British daily, The Times, Healy said: “Our nuclear deterrent is there as a deterrent. It is the ultimate guarantor to any would-be adversary. We have the power to do untold damage to them if they attack us. We are sometimes very British about our nuclear deterrent… the submarines may be silent, they may be hidden, but they worked every minute of every day to keep us safe, and we should be clear, strong, confident, and proud of that.”
It may be noted that the U.K.’s nuclear warheads and the missile that delivers them, Trident, are US-made and maintained. Britain’s missiles are part of a common pool shared with the US, creating a form of structural dependence.
The UK may have sole control over firing its missiles, but its deterrent does not mean much without continuing US assistance in the form of refurbished missiles.
That is why British experts are pointing out that London should develop its ”sovereign system” or cooperate with France, whose nuclear weapons and operational system are fully autonomous, thanks to its late President, Charles de Gaulle.
The late French President did not trust Washington to uphold its security guarantees. Extended deterrence was a sham for him, and he felt that if Paris had to be truly secure, it had no choice but to acquire a nuclear capability of its own.
As he put it in 1963, “American nuclear weapons remain the essential guarantee of world peace. . . . But it remains that American nuclear power does not necessarily respond immediately to all the eventualities concerning Europe and France. Thus . . . [we have decided] to equip ourselves with an atomic force that is unique to us.” The French called this the force de frappe—the “strike force.”
Now, British policy elites suggest that since the U.K. and France are bound by geography, the two democracies should pursue closer nuclear cooperation. They will not mind Germany’s potential role in a joint nuclear deterrent.
Friedrich Merz, Germany’s next chancellor, is reportedly anxious to huddle beneath the Anglo-French nuclear umbrella. He recently said he would “talk to the British and French about whether their nuclear protection could also be extended to us.” He is apparently for a steep rise in defense spending, some of which could go towards a multilateral nuclear force for Europe.
With Germany’s leadership now talking in this language, Poland does not want to remain behind. In a March 7 speech to the Polish parliament, Prime Minister Donald Tusk said that Poland “must reach for the most modern possibilities, also related to nuclear weapons and modern unconventional weapons. It is not enough to purchase conventional weapons, the most traditional ones.”
Similarly, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently told the European Council that a nuclear arsenal might be Ukraine’s only deterrent if NATO membership is not offered.
Even Turkey, which hosts US nuclear weapons through NATO’s sharing program, has indicated that it would not mind going nuclear. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is on record to have criticized foreign powers for dictating Turkey’s ability to build its own nuclear weapon.
Coming down to the Middle East, it is well known that Saudi Arabia would start its own nuclear weapon program if Iran acquires nukes in spite of international pressures. After all, Saudi Arabia had given significant backing to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, with the understanding that Pakistan could extend its nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia or even supply the latter with one upon request.
In the Indo-Pacific region, Trump’s re-election as the U.S. President has revived apprehensions in South Korea that he may revive his first term’s policy of accepting North Korea as a nuclear state in some form or another. In that case, Seoul will have its own nuclear weapons.
As has been explained in the EurAsian Times before, South Korea’s nuclear capability has never been in question since the days of late President Park Chung-hee, when the Nixon Administration was thinking of reducing the U.S. presence on the peninsula as per its Guam doctrine (1969), which said that henceforward, the US would like to provide more economic and security assistance to the allies than keeping American troops in them.
In fact, in 2004, Seoul revealed to the International Atomic Energy Agency that it had attempted to enrich uranium as late as 2000. It conducted chemical uranium enrichment from 1979 to 1981, separated small quantities of plutonium in 1982, experimented with uranium enrichment in 2000, and manufactured depleted uranium munitions from 1983 to 1987.
A nuclear South Korea will have an impact on Japan, experts say. Tokyo may have pledged not to possess nuclear weapons, but its ability to produce them quickly if needed is not under doubt.
Japan has an advanced civilian nuclear energy program, large stockpiles of separated plutonium, and an impressive local defense industry. So much so that, if allowed, Japanese scientists and technologists could take the final steps to nuclear armament within months. This is in the face of two nuclear neighbors, one of which (North Korea) is blatantly hostile. Then, of course, there is the perennial Chinese threat.
The China factor is crucial for Taiwan’s survival as a free and democratic island. If media reports are any indication, Taipei is not very sure of Trump’s security commitment towards the island. So, it will also try to have its own nukes.
As it is, Taiwan has already tried twice, in the 1970s and 1980s, but was caught and stopped by the United States each time. Therefore, it will not be a surprise if any sign of wavering US commitment to Taiwan, together with China’s growing nuclear capabilities, prompts it to revive its nuclear efforts.
All the above scenarios may not actually take place. After all, it is only a fear, not a fact as of now, that the Trump administration is about to abandon America’s alliance with traditional allies and partners nurtured over the years. But what is true is that Trump’s second coming to the White House has reinforced the lingering allure of nuclear arms even among non-nuclear states.
- Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
- CONTACT: prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com
